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NEW TECHNOLOGY AND THE LIMITATIONS OF
COPYRIGHT LAW: AN ARGUMENT FOR FINDING
ALTERNATIVES TO COPYRIGHT
LEGISLATION IN AN ERA OF
RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
MARY L. MILLS*
Copyright is the Cinderella of the law. Her rich older sisters,
Franchises and Patents, long crowded her into the chimney-corner.
Suddenly the fairy godmother, invention, endowed her with mechani-
cal and electrical devices as magical as the pumpkin coach and the
mice footmen. Now she whirls through the mad mazes of the glamor-
ous ball. I
INTRODUCTION
Writing in 1945, when technologies such as motion-picture and ra-
dio raised concerns about copyright protection, 2 the great copyright
scholar Zechariah Chafee could not have foreseen the dramatic changes
"invention" would have on copyright law.3 However, even to those
versed in current technology, innovations such as a holographic televi-
* The author would like to thank Professor J. Gordon Hylton for his advice and
encouragement.
1. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (1945), quoted in
Levine, Proprietary Rights in Databases and Software, 7 J. LIBR. ADMIN. 99 (Winter 1986).
2. Id. at 516.
3. Current technological developments include advances in computer software, cable and sat-
ellite television, telecommunication of visual images via "telephone" wires with optical fiber, high-
definition television which is claimed to have perfect picture and perfect sound, and digital audio and
video. See, e.g., Waters, The Future of Television, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 17, 1988, at 92 (discussing
transmittal of video images through telephone lines); Davis, Will High-Definition Be a Turn-Of?.,
Wall Street J., Jan. 20, 1989, at B1, col. 3; Making a Leap in TV Technology, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Jan. 23, 1989, at 48 (both articles address issues presented by the arrival of high-definition
television); A New Spin on Videodiscs, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 1989, at 68 (availability of motion pic-
tures on videodiscs, which are more interactive than videotapes and are almost indestructible:
'Even if your kid smears peanut butter on it, you just have to wipe it clean.'" Id. at 69.)
While computer software poses a number of pressing and cumbersome problems for copyright
law, the legal issues related to this technology are beyond the scope of this Note. Because of the
utilitarian nature of computer software, commentators have suggested that it should be protected by
suigeneris legislation along the lines of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-620, tit. II1, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (1984)). See Samuelson, Creating a
New Kind of Intellectual Property Applying the Lessons of Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70
MINN. L. REV. 471 (1985). Chips have a utilitarian function-they can be used to run clocks or
microwaves. This utility factor raises a number of issues outside of the realm of copyright law: "One
of the central tenets of copyright law is that a copyright will not protect 'utilitarian works.' that is.
works that have a usefulness beyond merely the conveying of information or the display of an ap-
pearance." Id. at 473.
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sion system that can project three-dimensional images into your living
room 4 or an "electronic book" that will redefine reading by combining
moving graphics and sound with traditional text5 are mind-boggling.
Technology is developing rapidly, which allows not only for storing in-
formation in various forms and in new combinations, but also for new
ways of transmitting data, such as the ability of a digital computer sys-
tem to transmit over telephone lines voice, text and images by transform-
ing them into a stream of computer pulses.6 Given the availability of
these new technologies, one writer's fanciful vision of the future of
"linked ... systems ... capable of storing faithful simulacra of the entire
treasure of the accumulated knowledge and artistic production of past
ages, and of taking into store new intelligence of all sorts as produced,"
has become a very real possibility.
7
Today, as in 1945, the purpose of copyright law is to grant limited
4. Waters, supra note 3, at 84.
5. Blake, The Electronic Book, 6 LIBR. Hi TECH 7 (1988) (describes new electronic product
called The Smart Book).
Blake notes that the concept of an electronic book has been around for some time. For exam-
ple, in HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY, Douglas Adams' version of the electronic book.
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA GALACTICA, used text, moving and still graphics, and sound to inform its
reader/user about any subject at the touch of a button. Current technology has brought this device
from science fiction to reality, and Blake believes it will eventually replace the printed book. Id.
See also Dynabook's Size, Utility, Gain Attention: Portability May Open New Applications for
CD-ROM, VIDEO COMPUTING, Jan./Feb. 1989, at 3; Touch Screen CD-ROM, INFO. WORLD REV..
Apr. 1989 at I (describing availability of new "electronic book" product that combines text, graphics
and sound); Desktop CD-ROM Production Now Possible, VIDEO COMPUTING, Jan./Feb. 1989, at I
(capacity to store various types of media on compact disc).
6. THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 123 (T. Forester ed. 1985). "[Tjelephone
companies around the world are racing to renovate their networks. Once the equipment is updated
to handle everything in digital form, networks become multifunctional links that can carry anything
from a simple telephone call to computerized airline reservations and television pictures." Id. The
optical scanner is a recent innovation that converts hard text and images into digital form. Recently,
hand-held scanners have appeared on the market. Van Name & Catchings, Handy Scanners, BYTE,
June 1989, at 187. As scanners become more commonplace, the ease of copying by "digitizing"
copyrighted text or graphics will have a great impact on copyright protection.
7. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright." Proposals and Prospects, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 831.
851 (1966).
The implications of digital technology for copyright law are truly astounding. They signify
almost a complete breakdown of exclusionary barriers. See infra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
A recent article described one scenario in a digitized world:
[L]ooking ahead to perhaps the year 2039, you may be a historian studying communica-
tions concepts in the late 20th century. You're on your sailboat and using a battery-pow-
ered work station with a built-in cellular phone. You dial up your regional information
utility and type in your request. Soon, your computer starts getting the results: the movie
"Broadcast News," let's say, plus a videotaped Fujitsu annual meeting, a multicolor chart
of AT&T's stock and market share, the Talking Heads' "Speaking in Tongues" album, and
this article.
You take snippets from all these works (you may want to delete this particular para-
graph) and work them into an hour-long presentation, with your own spoken and written
commentary. Then, you press another button and send it off to your editors in Paris and
Seoul.
The force that could make this scenario a reality is already swirling through one in-
[Vol. 65:307
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exclusive intellectual property rights as incentives to authors and cre-
ators to produce and disseminate intellectual works. Two interests are
served in fulfilling this purpose: (1) the copyright owners' interest in pro-
tecting and being compensated for their property rights, and (2) the pub-
lic's interest in having access to the copyrighted works. In the past,
copyright law struck a balance between the competing interests of own-
ers and users with relative ease because the means of disseminating and
copying intellectual works were relatively unsophisticated. However, the
stakes have become higher and the competing claims more difficult to
resolve when, as today, technology expands the innovative means of cre-
ating intellectual property, conveying information, and increasing public
access to those creative works.
8
One of the more recent conflicts to surface between users' and own-
ers' rights involved the in-home use of video recorders to tape copy-
righted works.9 This conflict culminated in two important events. The
first involved a United States Supreme Court opinion, Sony Corporation
of America v. Universal City Studios, ' 0 which addressed the applicability
of copyright law to a new technology. The second involved Congress'
enactment of the Record Rental Amendment, which prohibits the com-
mercial rental of sound recordings." While both the Court and Con-
dustry after another. It is the conversion of all manner of words, images and sounds into
computer data.
Miller, Digital Revolution: Vast Changes Loom As Computers Digest Words, Sound, Images, Wall St.
J., June 7, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
While the fictitious scenario described above may sound like mere fantasy, much of this technol-
ogy is already in place. Similar transfers of digital information, at least of text, are commonplace. In
fact, portions of this Note were transmitted from one personal computer in Chicago, Illinois via an
electronic communications system to a mainframe in Maryland, downloaded to a disk on yet another
personal computer, and sent electronically from that computer to a facsimile (fax) machine.
8. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 31 (1986) [hereinafter
OTA Report].
9. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
10. Id.
11. The Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 109 (1984)).
In the past five years, the volume of legislation proposed to address new technologies has in-
creased dramatically. In the 98th Congress alone, over 50 bills dealing with intellectual property
related to new technologies were introduced. A. LATMAN, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW vii
(W. Patry ed. 1986). For example, the Software Copyright Act of 1980 amended Section 117 of the
1976 Copyright Act to protect computer programs. However, of the many bills proposed that dealt
with home video or audio taping issues, the Record Rental Amendment was the only one enacted.
On September 26, 1988, the House passed Senate bill S. 2201 to extend the provisions of the
Record Rental Amendment. 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S13362-05 (daily ed. Sept. 27.
1988). The most significant House amendment to the Senate bill was to extend the act for an addi-
tional eight years, rather than permanently.
Recently, a similar amendment was proposed which would restrict rental of computer software.




gress have expressed concern over the inadequacy of existing copyright
law to deal with new technology, neither has provided a solution. The
reality of continuing technological innovations raises the question of how
Congress should respond to the problem of copyright protection.
This Note will examine the difficulty Congress faces in keeping
copyright law in step with changing technology. Part I will review the
background of copyright law with an emphasis on the impact of technol-
ogy on its development. Part II will examine the video recorder dispute
in the Sony litigation to illustrate the various conflicts between copyright
owners and users. This examination will provide the, background for
Part III, which will trace the history and analyze the merits of the Rec-
ord Rental Amendment of 1984-the federal legislation that resulted
from the Sony conflict. In Part IV, both legislative and non-legislative
solutions to the problem of adapting copyright law to changing technol-
ogy will be discussed. The Note concludes that a non-legislative, market
solution such as voluntary licensing provides the best answer during peri-
ods of rapid technological change.
I. BACKGROUND OF COPYRIGHT LAW
From its inception, copyright law has developed largely in response
to technological change,' 2 and this factor has had a greater impact on
copyright law than any other.' 3 Changes in technology tend to upset the
balance set by copyright law in favor of either the copyright owner, who
may be able to exclude others from his work more effectively, or the user,
who may make use of some technological innovation to access or exploit
more easily a protected work. 14 For example, the invention of the
photocopier facilitated the illegal copying of an entire printed work that
may have been prohibitively cumbersome, if not impossible, to copy by
hand. The problem of copyright infringement becomes more acute as
these innovations become available to individuals in the home-espe-
cially when the availability is widespread. A consideration of the unique
characteristics of intellectual property provides for a greater understand-
ing of the difficulty of effectively protecting intellectual property rights.
12. See COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD xi (N. Henry ed.
1978); OTA Report, supra note 8, at 19-20: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios. 464
U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
13. A. LATMAN. supra note II. at vii.
14. Id.
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A. The Concept of Competing Technologies'5
An owner of real or personal property can protect herself with ex-
clusionary barriers such as fences or locks. In contrast, an owner of in-
tellectual property cannot so easily exclude others from her work. This
is particularly the case when the owner intends that the public read,
view, or listen to the work. Consequently, copyright owners try to devise
ways to make their products available to the public while at the same
time excluding free riders (those who would appropriate the work with-
out paying the owner a fee).' 6 The owner's attempt to discriminate be-
tween buyers and free riders provides the backdrop for "an unceasing
'competition of technologies.' "'7 While owners tend to look for technol-
ogies that facilitate the dissemination of their products to the public and
exclude free riders, users tend to seek technologies that bypass the exclu-
sionary barriers.' 8.
The tension between the technologies of exclusion and access also
has to do with the medium which carries the intellectual product. The
media used to transmit intellectual goods to the user can take on a vari-
ety of forms and properties which affect the ability to protect or use a
particular good. '9 For example, the text or images in a printed book are
more difficult to appropriate than text or images which may be
downloaded to a computer disk or copied electronically. The ability of
the owner to protect her intellectual good from being easily copied allows
her to be compensated for the use of that good because it will be
purchased instead of appropriated by free riders.20 However, once a
technology which facilitates copying becomes available, the owner can
lose control of the intellectual good because free riders can not only ap-
propriate the good but can also become secondary producers of it.2I
When the owner loses control of her property, the incentive to pro-
duce it is also lost. One solution is to develop new exclusionary technolo-
gies, but these are often cumbersome to effectuate and are soon
penetrated. 22 The other solution is some kind of legal protection. 23 Be-
15. The concept of competing technologies is developed fully in Adelstein & Peretz, The
Competition of Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective,
5 INTI, R-v. L. & ECON. 209 (1985).
16. Id. at 213.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 214.
19. Id. at 219.
20. Id. at 221.
21. Id.
22. During the Sony trial, the district court judge rejected the suggestion that Sony could man-
ufacture the Betamax with a jamming device: "If he were to order Sony to install a jamming device.
• ..'some bright young entrepreneur. unconnected with Sony, is going to come up with a device to
1989]
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ginning with one of the first major technological breakthroughs, the de-
velopment of movable type in the fifteenth century, copyright statutes
have served as substitutes for owner-created exclusionary barriers.
24
B. The Development of Copyright Law
The seminal copyright legislation, the English Statute of Anne,
25
was enacted in 1709 in response to the first major technological innova-
tion: the invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century. The
ability to mass-produce books resulted in a host of secondary producers,
or "book pirates," who purchased books for the sole purpose of copying
them and reselling the copies to consumers. 26 Threatened with the de-
struction of their livelihood, the original producers of the books, the Sta-
tioners, petitioned Parliament for relief. The resulting Statute of Anne
granted exclusive property rights for a limited period of time, after which
the protected works would be returned to the public domain.
27
The basis for copyright law in the United States is derived from the
Statute of Anne,28 and is found in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.
This section grants authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re-
spective writings and discoveries "for a limited time."' 29 There are two
opposite interpretations of the purpose of copyright law: (1) that its pur-
pose is not to reward authors, but to secure the "general benefits derived
by the public from the labors of authors, ' 30 and (2) that its purpose
should be to reward copyright owners to provide incentive to produce
their works.3' However, it is more logical to view the purpose of copy-
unjam the jam. And then we have a device to unjam the jamming of the jam, and we all end up like
jelly.' " J. LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE VCR WARS 114
(1987).
23. See W. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK 1 (1981).
24. Id.
25. 8 Anne c. 19 (1710).
26. A. LATMAN, supra note 11, at 3; Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 15, at 224.
27. 8 Anne c. 19 (1710).
28. W. HURST, COPYRIGHT 6 (1977).
29. U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8, cl. 8. "The Congress shall have the Power ... To Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for a limited Time to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writipgs and Discoveries."
This clause addresses both copyright and patent, but there is some question as to whether "sci-
ence" refers to works of authors and "useful arts" to works of inventors, or vice versa. I NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, sec. 1.03[a]. at 1-31 n.l (1988).
30. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
31. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963. 965 (9th Cir. 1981). rev'd 464
U.S. 417 (1984), voicing the opposite view that the reward and incentive to copyright owners should
be of primary interest, rather than the benefit to the public:
Despite what is said in some of the authorities that the author's interest in securing an
economic reward for his labors is "a secondary consideration," it is clear that the real
[Vol. 65:307
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right law as a balancing of the interests. Authors will not have the incen-
tive to create if they are not compensated, but it would be unfair to grant
them exclusive rights in their intellectual property if the public does not
benefit from them in return.
32
In its first incarnation, United States copyright law protected ex-
pressions of information in printed format: books, maps and charts. 33
The process of copying these works was expensive and difficult to conceal
from the owner since it involved a substantial investment in both printing
equipment, such as presses and movable type, and skilled labor. Copy-
right owners could therefore detect and stop these types of infringements
with relative ease. 34 However, as new technologies emerged that facili-
tated both the copyright owners' ability to disseminate their works and
the users' ability to appropriate them, Congress expanded the copyright
statute further to protect the owners' rights. 35 For example, in 1802 the
statute was extended to protect prints and in 1865, photographs were
added. 36 The first complete revision of the copyright laws resulted in the
Copyright Act of March 4, 1909.37 There were no major changes to the
1909 Act until 1976,38 when the most comprehensive revision of copy-
purpose of the copyright scheme is to encourage works of the intellect, and that this pur-
pose is to be achieved by reliance on the economic incentives granted to authors ... by the
copyright scheme. This scheme relies on the author to promote the progress of science by
permitting him to control the cost of and access to his novelty. It is based on the premise
that the exclusive right granted by the copyright laws "will not impose unacceptable costs
to society in terms of limiting access to published works or pricing them too high."
32. President Madison's comments on intellectual property support the interpretation of the
copyright clause of the Constitution as requiring a balance between the interests of intellectual prop-
erty owners and the public. With reference to owners of copyrights and patents, Madison wrote
"The public good fully coincides with the claims of individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 272
(J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
In Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court's statement of the purpose of copyright captures the
notion of this balance: "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors .... .- 347 U.S.
201. 219 (1954).
33. Act of 1790. ch. 15, § 1, Stat. 124, cited in OTA Report, supra note 8, at 99.
34. Id.
35. The U.S. Copyright Act has been amended many times. It was completely revised in 1831
(protection extended to musical compositions; extension of term of protection), 1870 (protection
extended to paintings, drawings, chromolithographs. statues), 1909 (protected subject matter in-
cluded all writings of authors); and 1976. Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 460-61 (1982) (Blackmun, J. dissent-
ing) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976)).
36. A. LATMAN & R. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 5 (1981) [hereinafter
LATMAN & GORMAN].
37. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810, at vii (West 1977).
38. While not a major revision, the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, which amended the
1909 Act to provide for a copyright in sound recordings, was significant because it responded to the
problem of illegal copying of phonorecords made possible by the development-and the more wide-
spread availability-of audio recording equipment. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codi-
fied as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101. 102(a)(7), 106(l). 106(3)-(4), 116. 401-02. 412. 501-04 (Supp.
1989]
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right law occurred. The need for such a revision was largely due to the
development of a number of technologies which made the 1909 Act obso-
lete, such as motion picture, radio, television, and audio and video re-
cording equipment. 39 The revision process was complicated by the
appearance of technologies which the pending copyright bills failed to
address, and it took over twenty years for both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate to agree on a revised law.40 In an attempt to address
more thoroughly the problematic issues raised by new technologies, Con-
gress created the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) as part of the 1976 revision of the Copy-
right Act. CONTU's mission was to recommend ways that copyright
law should be adapted to new technologies, and it was designed to focus
exclusively on the two technologies current at that time, computers and
photocopiers.4 ' In addition to computer software and photocopying, the
1976 Act included provisions for motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, cable television systems, and public broadcasting of protected
works. 42 Although the 1976 Act was designed to account for a number
of technological innovations affecting copyright protection, the rapid de-
velopment of newer technologies-especially those that allow for wide-
spread copying by individuals-has prompted a number of calls to
Congress for still further revisions of the copyright law.
43
Over the years, the copyright law has been amended in response to a
number of technological changes so that its purpose of balancing the
rights of owners and users is fulfilled. This balance is illustrated by the
juxtaposition of the two principal rights-granting sections of Title 17, sec-
tions 106 and 107. Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a number of
exclusive rights on the copyright owner, such as the right to reproduce
and distribute the copyrighted work.44 Section 107, a codification of the
IV 1980) cited in Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Hone Audio Recording." Dispelling the Betainax
Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505 (1982).
39. LATMAN & GORMAN, supra note 36, at 7: NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOG-
ICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (CONTU), FINAL REPORT 3 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU
Final Report].
40. CONTU Final Report, supra note 39, at 3.
41. Id. As a result of CONTU's recommendations, the Copyright Act was modified to treat
computer programs as protected literary works and to include guidelines for photocopying, particu-
larly by libraries.
42. A. LATMAN, supra note 11, at 58.
43. See supra note II (reference to the increasing volume of legislation proposed to address new
technologies).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) reads as follows:
Exclusive rights in copyrighted works:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(I) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
[Vol. 65:307
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judge-made doctrine of fair use,45 describes circumstances under which
normally infringing activities are permissible.
46
The fair use doctrine was reduced to law in the Copyright Act of
1976. 47 While no brightline definition of the doctrine ever emerged in the
courts, 48 Congress incorporated the set of criteria that had evolved "to
provide some guage [sic] for balancing the equities."' 49 The four factors
to be considered in determining fair use are (1) the purpose and character
of the use, (2) the nature of the work, (3) the amount used in relation to
the whole, and (4) the effect of the use on the potential market for the
work.50 While the bill that amended the Copyright Act to include the
fair use doctrine endorsed "the purpose and general scope of the judicial
doctrine . . . [there was no] disposition to freeze the doctrine in the stat-
ute, especially during a period of rapid technological change. 51 Even
with this disclaimer, the fact that the fair use doctrine was codified at all
suggests Congress' recognition of the need to balance the interests of
copyright owners with those of the public users.
Because the fair use doctrine is the greatest limitation on exclusive
ownership rights, most of the conflicts which arise over whether certain
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
45. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)(Judge Story found that there
were certain "justifiable," noninfringing uses of copyrighted works); Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1-35
(C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means speci-
fied by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
47. COPYRIGHT AcT oF 1976, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S.
COD. CONG. & ADMIN. Nj:ws 5659, 5678.
48. Id. at 5679. "Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applica-
ble definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts." Id.
49. Id.
50. See supra note 46.
51. COPYRIGHT ACT or 1976. supra note 47, at 5680.
19893
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uses constitute infringement center on its application. The conflicts be-
come more difficult to resolve when they involve the additional uncer-
tainty of new technology. The Supreme Court has addressed copyright
disputes in light of new technologies on only a few occasions 52 and has
provided little guidance on the application of the fair use doctrine. In
fact, the Court has been divided each time it has addressed the doc-
trine.53 The courts' difficulty with balancing the "sharp conflict of inter-
ests" 54 of owners and users, especially in defining the parameters of the
fair use doctrine as applied to a new technology, was illustrated in the
Sony case.
55
II. TREATMENT OF THE HOME RECORDING
CONFLICT IN THE COURTS
A. Sony Corporation of America i. Universal City Studios
56
The litigation in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Stu-
dios began in the federal district court in 197957 and concluded in the
Supreme Court's decision in 1984. Along the way, the decision came full
circle: the district court found that videocassette recorder (VCR) users
had a right to record copyrighted motion pictures; the appellate court
reversed, holding that the users did not have a right under the fair use
doctrine to copy an entire copyrighted work; and the Supreme Court
reversed again and held that the use of VCRs was protected under the
fair use doctrine because the copying was not for commercial purposes.
The conflict arose when Universal City Studios and Walt Disney
52. The Supreme Court addressed the effect of technological advancements on the interpreta-
tion of the copyright law in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968)
(Copyright Act had to be read in light of major technological change where CATV could not have
been contemplated at the time the act was drafted. "We must read the statutory language of 60
years ago in light of drastic technological change." Id. at 396); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (Court found that while changes in commercial
relationships were significant, they could not be controlled by copyright litigation based on laws
enacted long before broadcast or CATV were imagined); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 155 (1975) (when technological change renders literal terms of Copyright Act ambigu-
ous, it must be construed in light of its basic purpose, stimulating creativity for the general public
good); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios. Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (noting, and
following, courts' reluctance to expand copyright protection without legislative guidance).
53. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 476 (1984)(Blackmun, J..
dissenting)(citing Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973),
aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
54. Chafee. supra note 1, at 516.
55. 464 U.S. 417 (1984); rev'g 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981); rev'g 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal.
1979).
56. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
57. 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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Productions brought suit against the Sony Corporation for its manufac-
ture of the Betamax VCR. Universal and Disney argued that Sony was
liable for infringement because the device was used for home recording of
their copyrighted motion pictures and other works from television.5 8
While the suit was against the manufacturer of the VCR for contributory
infringement, one of the most important issues was whether copying by
individuals in the home constituted infringement or fair use.5 9 The dis-
trict court noted both the "need for wide availability of audiovisual
works [and] for monetary reward to authors to assure the production of
these works,"'60 but ultimately found the public's interest in the accessi-
bility of copyrighted works to be more important.6 1 In a complete turn-
around, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision unanimously. 62 It criticized the decision below for stretching
fair use beyond the dictates of the statute, noting that fair use usually
applies where part of a copyrighted work is used within another work,
not where the entire work is copied and used as the original was intended
to be.6 3 Where the district court decision favored the public's interest in
gaining access to the copyrighted works, the court of appeal's decision
58. Id. at 432. Plaintiffs sought money damages and an injunction against the manufacture and
marketing of the Betamax VCRs.
59. This issue is most pertinent to a discussion of the impact of new technology on copyright
law because the latest technologies are more available to individual users than ever before. As this
trend continues, the breakdown of copyright owners' ability to protect their intellectual property and
the desire of individuals to access those works will increase.
60. 480 F. Supp. at 432.
61. In its fair use analysis, the district court found that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently show
that home taping caused them harm as required in section 107(4) of the statute. Id. at 451. The
court further held that even if home taping were an infringement, the defendants were not liable for
it directly or contributorily, reasoning that VCRs were "staple articles of commerce" capable of
noninfringing uses and that the defendants were not responsible for the VCR's mere potential to
infringe. Id. at 457.
The district court case represented the first time any court found fair use where an entire work
was copied and a defendant copied for entertainment and convenience as opposed to copying for
purposes of research or scholarship. In contrast, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct.
Cl., 74, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973) aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)(per curiam),
involved the copying of an entire work for scholarly purposes. This case dealt with defendant librar-
ies copying entire articles for interlibrary loan purposes, where the articles were not meant to be
returned. In the name of scholarly research, this copying was held to be fair use. The Supreme
Court split 4-4, so no opinion issued. However, Congress addressed the issue in the revision in the
Copyright Act of 1976 by including the language that systematic photocopying by libraries was an
infringement-but "systematic" was never defined. 17 U.S.C. § 108(g)(2) (1976).
62. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
63. Id. at 970 (quoting L. SELZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24 (1978)).
The court of appeals found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated potential harm to their market
because the cumulative effect of mass reproduction made possible by VCRs would diminish the
potential market for their works. Id. at 974. It also rejected the "staple article of commerce'" argu-
ment after finding that the VCR had no substantial noninfringing uses-it was used mostly to copy
television programs, almost all of which were copyrighted works. Id. at 975.
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supported the copyright owners' interest in protecting their property
rights.
The pronounced disparity between the district court and the court
of appeals opinions foreshadowed the five to four split in the Supreme
Court's opinion. 64 While the authors of the majority and dissenting
opinions agreed on very little, they both expressed reservations about
providing judicial solutions to the inability of copyright law to keep pace
with technology. The majority in particular expressed its concerns in a
lengthy disclaimer. 65 It stated that it is Congress' responsibility to define
the scope of the limited monopoly granted to copyright holders, 66 and
that the judiciary has consistently deferred to Congress "when major
technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.
'67
1. Majority Opinion
The Court reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that video
recording in the home for the purpose of private, noncommercial
"timeshifting" was not infringing, 68 and that the sale of VCRs to the
general public did not constitute contributory infringement. 69 In consid-
ering whether home videotaping constituted fair use, the Court focused
on only two parts of the four part fair use test,70 the purpose of the use
and the harm to the copyright holder, without full discussion of the na-
ture of the work or the amount used. The Court addressed three major
issues in reaching its decision: the noncommercial use of the VCRs, the
plaintiffs' failure to show the likelihood of harm to the market for their
works, and the lack of specific language in the Copyright Act prohibiting
the sale of VCRs or the recording of copyrighted works for later viewing.
In its analysis of the purpose of the use of the copyrighted works,
the Court stated that use of the VCR to make copies for commercial or
profit-making purposes would be presumptively unfair.7 1 The majority
focused on timeshifting as the primary use of VCRs, but failed to address
64. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion in which he was joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices White, Brennan and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion and
was joined by Justices Marshall, Powell and Rehnquist. In addition to the divided Court, this ten-
sion was reflected in the unusually large number of amicus curiae briefs filed-over thirty-on behalf
of both parties. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 418-20 (1984).
65. Id. at 429-32.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 431. The Court asserted that "[s]ound policy, as well as history, supports [the
Court's] consistent deference to Congress." Id.
68. The Court defined "timeshifting'" as the practice of recording a program to view it once at a
later time, and thereafter erase it. Id. at 423.
69. Id. at 456.
70. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
71. 464 U.S. at 449.
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the issue of "librarying ' '72 that had concerned the court of appeals. 73 Be-
cause the district court's findings showed that timeshifting for private
home use was a noncommercial, nonprofit activity, the Supreme Court
found that such use was presumptively fair. 74 The Court noted that soci-
ety benefited from timeshifting because it expanded public access to the
programs.
75
As to the effect of the use on the potential market for the copy-
righted work, the Court acknowledged that even copying for noncom-
mercial purposes could have a negative impact. 76 However, it modified
the standard for noncommercial uses by placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiffs77 to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there is
some meaningful likelihood of future harm.78 Because Universal and
Walt Disney failed to demonstrate such a likelihood, the Court found
that the home taping of their copyrighted works was fair use.
79
Finally, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision because it
found no specific language in the Copyright Act that prohibited the sale
of VCRs or the copying of programs for later viewing.8 0 It noted in its
conclusion, however, that Congress might want to provide legislation
that addressed the new technology."'
2. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun, writing for the four member dissent, also called
72. "Librarying" is the practice of recording programs and keeping them in a "video library"
for future viewing.
73. 659 F.2d at 974. While timeshifting involves the user's viewing at a later, more convenient
time, with librarying the user actually "takes" and keeps copies of a taped program without compen-
sating the owner.
74. 464 U.S. at 449.
75. Id. at 454. In concluding that timeshifting was not infringing, the Court relied in part on
the testimony of Fred Rogers, owner of the copyright on the children's program Mister Rogers'
Neighborhood. Id. at 445. Mr. Rogers testified that he did not object to noncommercial home taping.
Id. However, one writer observed that Rogers' opinion and that of other non-objectors were sought
when Universal was trying to stop home taping altogether, rather than get compensated for it. J.
LARDNER, supra note 22, at 264.
76. 464 U.S. at 450.
77. Fair use is raised as an affirmative defense by the defendant, on whom the burden of proof
normally rests.
78. 464 U.S. at 451.
79. Id. In finding that Sony was not liable for contributory infringement, the Court began its
analysis by distinguishing the plaintiffs' principal case, Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55
(1911). In Kalem, the defendant produced an unauthorized film dramatization of the book, Ben
Hur. It not only provided the means to accomplish the infringing activity by making the motion
picture and selling it to jobbers for distribution, it supplied the copyrighted work itself. Sony, on the
other hand, did not supply VCR consumers with the plaintiffs' works, the plaintiffs did by broadcast-
ing them on public television. Sony, 464 U.S. at 436.
80. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
81. Id.
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for congressional action.8 2 However, he strongly criticized the majority's
reliance on the Court's tradition of deferring to Congress when techno-
logical innovations appear,8 3 and rejected as seriously flawed the major-
ity's conclusion that copying of an entire copyrighted work was fair use,
even for purposes of timeshifting. 84 Blackmun was critical of the major-
ity's expansion of fair use to include copying for entertainment purposes,
as opposed to "productive" uses, or " 'situations in which fair use is most
commonly recognized ... [such as] criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, ... [and] scholarship .... "-85 In Blackmun's view, making a
video recording of a copyrighted work to be used for the same purpose as
the original added no value or benefit to the public,8 6 and therefore
should not be exempt under the fair use doctrine. In addition to con-
cluding that Sony was liable, Blackmun also suggested possible remedies,
such as an award of damages, a continuing royalty, or a form of limited
injunction.
7
B. Overview of the Sony Litigation: An Illustration of the Difficulty of
Reconciling the Owner-User Conflict When a New Technology
Is Involved
The district court opinion favored the interest of the public in hav-
ing free access to copyrighted works. 8 The court of appeals, on the
other hand, favored the interest of the copyright owners in protection of
and compensation for their works.89 Both decisions illustrate the diffi-
culty of balancing the two interests when a new technology is involved.
The Supreme Court's five to four decision further reflects the difficulty in
balancing the two competing interests. 90
With the considerable interests at stake on both sides of the conflict,
any position the Court might have taken was uncomfortable-reversing
the Ninth Circuit decision would have seemed to be a disregard for prop-
erty rights, as the four dissenting Justices apparently viewed the matter.
On the other hand, enforcing the Ninth Circuit decision would have led
first to the unpopular result of allowing copyright owners to prosecute
82. Id. at 457.
83. Id. "'Perhaps a . . . more accurate description is that the Court has tended to evade the hard
issues when they arise in the area of copyright law. I see no reason for the Court to be particularly
pleased with this tradition or to continue it." Id.
84. Id. at 493.
85. Id. at 478 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107).
86. Id. at 480.
87. Id. at 499.
88. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 64-87 and accompanying text.
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individuals for recording activities conducted in the privacy of their
homes, and second to the necessity of devising a means for enforcing
owner rights against an impossible number of VCR owners.
Neither the majority nor the dissent was able to support its position
with a concrete solution. The majority could not go so far as to find fair
use in wholesale copying, allowing instead that copying for "time-shift-
ing" purposes was permissible with the understanding that the copy
would be erased after a short period of time.9' However, the majority
did not discuss how the copyright would be enforced after the period of
time had passed in which the tape should have been-erased. Moreover,
the Court did not provide any guidance as to how long that period of
time might be. While the dissent acknowledged the existence of enforce-
able property rights,92 it did not consider the means by which such rights
should be enforced.
Faced with new technology (the VCR), the Court's reluctance to
interpret the Copyright Act in favor of either copyright owners or users
was understandable considering the uncertainty of the impact this new
technology would have on access to copyrighted works. The most strik-
ing aspect of the Sony decision is the fact that both the majority and the
dissent, divided on every other point, agreed that Congress should ad-
dress the issue. When Congress finally did speak, it was in the form of
the Record Rental Amendment of 1984.
93
III. RECORD RENTAL AMENDMENT OF 1984
Although a number of bills were proposed and major lobbying ef-
forts exerted on both sides of the home recording issue as a result of the
Sony litigation,94 only a single, narrowly drafted law was enacted. The
Record Rental Amendment of 1984 modifies the "first sale" doctrine of
the Copyright Act. The first sale doctrine allows the owner of a copy of a
work to sell or otherwise dispose of the copy without the copyright
owner's consent. 95 This limitation on the copyright owner's distribution
right is permitted in order to prevent the copyright owner from exercis-
91. 464 U.S. at 423.
92. Id. at 482-86. (Blackmun argued that a showing of potential, rather than actual, harm to
the market for a copyrighted work is sufficient to establish copyright infringement, thereby favoring
the protection of property over the public's access to it.)
93. Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1984))(Supp. 111 1985).
94. For example, the Home Recording Rights Coalition was formed in response to the Ninth
Circuit decision and proved to be a powerful lobbying group. See, Home Recording of Copyrighted
Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783. H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705.
Before the Subcomn. on Courts. Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1982) [hereinafter Home Recording of Copyrighted Works].
95. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
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ing control over lawfully made copies once they have been sold. The
doctrine was amended to prohibit the commercial rental, lease or lending
of copyrighted phonorecords of sound recordings without the copyright
owner's permission. Despite its narrow reach, the Record Rental
Amendment is important because it represents a positive step by Con-
gress in responding to technological changes that affect traditional copy-
right protection. 96  However, the Amendment illustrates Congress'
difficulty in drafting copyright legislation that keeps pace with changing
technology.
A. Legislative History
While the official legislative history of the Amendment attributes its
origin to hearings in 198 3,97 the genesis of the legislation actually was the
1981 Ninth Circuit opinion in Sony.9s The Ninth Circuit opinion was
viewed as a victory by copyright owners who wanted protection of intel-
lectual property rights that were threatened by technological innova-
tions.99 In an immediate attempt to overrule the decision, however, a
number of bills were introduced in Congress to exempt home video re-
cording from copyright infringement. 00 Although the home video bills
were not directly related to the rental of audio recordings, the record
rental legislation evolved from these bills.
This immediate Congressional response was not surprising in light
of the public's negative reaction to Sony, reflected in editorial cartoons
96. Horowitz, The Record Rental Amendment of 1984. A Case Study in the Effort to Adapt
Copyright Law to New Technology, 12 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 31 (Aut. 1987).
In the hearings on the Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, it was noted that the proposals
were being considered with the underlying question: "How should the copyright law respond to
technological change?" Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine. Hearings on H.R. 1027, H.R. 1029, and
S. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 523 (1983-84) [hereinafter Audio & Video First
Sale Doctrine).
97. Record Rental Amendment of 1984. S.Rep. No. 162, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2898, 2900.
98. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
99. There was a feeling ... that [the Court of Appeals] decision would serve as protection
against still further technological advances that would be even more damaging-whether it
was going to be the personal Xerox machine that everyone would put in his home or the
use, by organizations, of transmission devices with instant printers so that a large corpora-
tion could purchase one copy of a magazine and transmit the important articles to its
divisions and its subsidiaries across the country instantaneously.
J. LARDNER, supra note 22, at 129.
100. H.R. 4794, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 24798 (1981) (one day after the court of
appeals issued its decision, Representative Parris introduced this bill to counter the effect of Sony):
H.R. 4783, 97th Cong.. 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 24477 (1981); H.R. 5250. 97th Cong.. 1st Sess..
127 CONG. Ric. 31889 (1981).
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and commentaries by reference to big brotherism and video police.'0 1
One proposed bill, introduced by Representative Parris, undid the Ninth
Circuit's holding with one brief sentence: "[T]he fair use of a copy-
righted work includes the recording and use of copyrighted works in a
private home by an individual on a home videorecorder if the recordings
are not used for direct or indirect commercial advantage."' 1 2 Similar
bills were introduced in the House and in the Senate.
10 3
Those in favor of the Ninth Circuit decision likewise introduced
bills to counter the proposed home recording exemption legislation. In
December 1981, Senator Mathias introduced a bill that would have es-
tablished compulsory licensing for video recording devices, with royalties
for copyright owners to be determined by the Copyright Royalty Tribu-
nal and paid by VCR manufacturers and distributors. 0 4 The bill was an
attempt to strike "a proper balance between the viewers who tape at
home and the creative artists who own the copyrights .... ,,to5 Never-
theless, this bill set a protectionist tone by noting that if "copyrights
serve the great interest of society, failing to protect the rights created by
such instruments is not excused by the fact that new technologies have
made the protection of those rights more difficult."' 0 6 The rationale be-
hind making royalties applicable to manufacturers and distributors of
video recording devices and media, rather than the individuals actually
copying them, seemed to be an attempt to make the bill more palatable to
those concerned with unhampered public access to copyrighted works
and to the consuming public in general.' 0 7 Representative Edwards in-
troduced a similar bill in the House. 10 8 The hearings on this bill also
reflected a concern on the part of its supporters that the bill not appear to
encroach on public access. 0 9
101. See, e.g., Smile-You're on Bootlegged Tape, The Wash. Post, Oct. 22, 1981, at A30, col. 1,
cited in Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, supra note 94, at 223-24.
102. H.R. 4794, supra note 100.
103. H.R. 4783, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. Ri-c. 24477 (1981)(introduced by Representa-
tive Duncan); H.R. 5250, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 31889 (1981) (introduced by
Representive Foley); S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 24674 (1981) (introduced by
Senators DeConcini and D'Amato).
104. Amend. No. 1242 to S. 1758, 97th Cong.. 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 32206 (1981).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 32206-07.
107. "[W]hile [my amendment] establishes the right of the copyright owner to compensation. it
does not get the people taping at home directly involved in the collection of fees. The importers and
manufacturers who benefit financially from home recording will pay the royalty .... "" Id. at 32206.
108. H.R. 5488, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.. 128 CONG. REC. 1325 (1982). Edwards noted that he
supported the basic goals of the bills proposing exemptions for home video recording. but stated that
if Congress legitimized off-the-air home video recording, it "also [had] a responsibility to protect the
rights of those who create and own intellectual property." Id.
109. "Executives of the motion picture industry ... have persistently informed members of the
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In addition, both Senator Mathias' and Representative Edwards'
bills contained a clause that modified the first sale doctrine by forbidding
the commercial rental, lending or lease of copies of sound recordings or
motion pictures without the copyright owner's permission. 0 The rec-
ord industry lobbied successfully to expand these bills to include the
same protection for audio recordings as they did for video. "' The hear-
ings again reflected a desire to strike a balance between owners and
users.' 12
Despite all the legislative activity triggered by the Sony decision, the
only law that Congress ultimately enacted prohibited the rental, lending
or lease of sound recordings. Throughout all of the hearings, strong
cases were made for both sides of the home recording issue. Statistical
reports and testimony were presented that concluded that home taping
harmed the motion picture and recording industries while other reports
stated that no harm was caused. 13 Why, after all the fury caused by
Sony, did Congress draft legislation which failed to address the issue of
copying audio and audiovisual works? A number of possible responses
are discussed in the following section.
B. Analysis of Record Rental Legislation
One explanation for the narrow legislative solution was Congress'
apparent reluctance to address the home taping issue with the Supreme
House that they do not oppose a home video exemption as long as it is linked to fair compensation.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the solution to the VCR's illegal intercepts of television
programing could be a continuing royalty." Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, supra note 94,
at 47 (Statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Assoc. of America).
110. Section 4 of Senator Mathias' bill provided that:
[S]ection 109(a) of chapter 1 of title 17 of the United States Code is amended by ...
the following: "Provided, however, That the owner of a particular phonorecord of a sound
recording, copy of a motion picture or other audiovisual work lawfully made under this
title may not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, dispose of the possession of that
phonorecord or copy by rental, lease or lending, for purposes of direct or indirect commer-
cial advantage."
Amend. No. 1242 to S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 32206 (1981). The modification
was set forth in identical language in Section 5 of Edwards' bill. H.R. 5488, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
128 CONG. REC. 1325 (1982).
111. Amend. No. 1333 to S. 1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 3377 (1982); H.R.
5705, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 3120 (1982). See J. LARDNER, supra note 22, at 210
("Baker and Byrd approached Mathias and told him . . . that the recording industry 'didn't want to
be left at the station.' ")
112. "We respectfully submit that H.R. 570[5] and Amendment 1333 to S. 1758 strike a proper
balance between the needs of copyright owners ... and a public armed with a tremendous technolog-
ical power within the home." Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, supra note 94, at 147 (State-
ment of Jack Copeland, Chairman, Copyright Comm. of the Training Media Distributors Assoc.).
113. See generally, Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, supra note 94: Audio & Video First
Sale Doctrine, supra note 96; Video and Audio Home Taping: Hearings on S. 31 and S. 175 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 98th Cong..
1st Sess. 51 (1983) [hereinafter Video & Audio Home Taping].
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Court on the verge of deciding Sony. When the Court finally issued its
ruling, Representative Kastenmeier,"l 4 who was actively involved with
the proposed home taping legislation, issued a press release in which he
stated that in light of the Court's decision, he did not expect Congress to
enact legislation calling for the imposition of royalties on home taping. 115
After noting the unlikelihood of adopting legislation to provide relief for
copyright owners in either royalties or prohibitive amendments, Kas-
tenmeier qualified his statement by adding that there were other avenues
that the motion picture and recording industries could pursue. He al-
luded to the pending proposals, found in both the Edwards and Mathias
bills, to modify the first sale doctrine with regard to both audio and video
rentals. 116 The motion picture and recording industries apparently fol-
lowed Kastenmeier's suggestion; their lobbying efforts focused on the
modification of the first sale doctrine to prohibit audio and video rentals
shortly after Kastenmeier issued the press release. 17 Ironically, the Sony
litigation which sparked the home recording issue in Congress ultimately
caused its downfall there, as discouraged lobbyists abandoned the home
copying legislation to pursue the first sale bills restricting video and audio
rental.1 18
In the end, the impetus behind the video rental legislation was lost.
This loss was likely caused by several factors, three of which stand out.
First, the motion picture industry realized that they had a market to ex-
ploit in the rental business. Second, video rental had become an estab-
lished enterprise; retailers were lobbying against measures that would
destroy their livelihood, and home recording rights groups were lobbying
for free access to the works. 119 Finally, the availability of sound record-
ings on compact discs (CDs) turned attention from video to audio. Not
only does digital sound allow for a master-like copy, the disc itself is
virtually indestructible and can be used again and again. 120 So, what
began as a conflict that begged a solution to the problem of home copying
of motion pictures-a conflict which presented the opportunity to ad-
114. Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, is the most active Congress-
man in the area of intellectual property.
115. Press release of Representative Robert Kastenmeier (Jan. 17, 1984) quoted in Horowitz,
supra note 96, at 53.
116. Id.
117. See Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, supra note 96, at 3843.
118. J. LARDNER, supra note 22, at 278-81.
119. Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, supra note 96, at 212 (Statement of Jack Wayman.
Senior Vice President, Consumer Electronics Group, Electronic Industries Association, Chairman
Home Recording Rights Coalition); Id. at 537 (Statement of Austin 0. Furst, Jr., Chairman, Ves-
tron Video).
120. Do CDs Rot? (Call Pigs Fly?), DIGITAL AUDIO & COMPACT Disc REV., Oct. 1988, at 5.
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dress the broader issue of home copying in general-ended with legisla-
tion that addressed only the rental of sound recordings, the Record
Rental Amendment.
The problem with the Record Rental Amendment's narrow scope is
manifested in two significant ways. First, it failed to address directly the
issue of unauthorized reproduction, the type of copyright infringement
that it was originally proposed to resolve. Second, this failure quickly
resulted in a call for Congress to enact legislation that did confront the
issue of home copying, as it attempted to do with the proposed Digital
Audio Recorder Act of 1987.121
1. The Failure of the Record Rental Amendment to Address Directly
the Home Recording Problem
In focusing solely on the problem of unauthorized distribution, the
Record Rental Amendment failed to address the underlying and more
pressing problem of unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted works.
Even Melville B. Nimmer, the foremost authority on copyright law,
characterized the importance of an exclusive distribution right-in this
case, the exclusive right to rent copyrighted works-as a protection from
infringing reproduction. 2 2 According to Nimmer, the right of exclusive
distribution should not be viewed as the only ground for a cause of action
against the infringing reproducer, but as a practical means for the prose-
cuting copyright owner to go after the distributor where the infringing
reproducer may be unavailable. 12 3 The Record Rental Amendment
seems to preclude a cause of action based on unauthorized reproduction,
leaving unauthorized distribution as the only avenue of relief for the
copyright owner.
The Record Rental Amendment provided a solution for the problem
of copying facilitated by record rental, but not for the broader problem of
unauthorized home recording in general. Directing the Record Rental
Amendment to rental operators as opposed to those individuals actually
doing the copying was an easy way for Congress to avoid facing the
home taping problem. This approach was particularly odd considering
several congressmen had stated that the real issue was. home recording,
not rental. '
24
Another indication that the issue of home taping was sidestepped
121. S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) and H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
122. 2 NINMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.12[A] at 8-120.8 (1988).
123. Id.
124. "Of course, the real problem from the music or recording industry's view, as everyone
concedes, is not rentals as such, but rather the antecedent, separate and wider phenomenon of home
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was reflected in testimony supporting H.R. 1029.125 This testimony indi-
cated that the purpose behind the original proposal for legislation was
not specifically to stop rentals but to ensure that copyright owners were
compensated for the reproduction of their works. 126 After noting that
the VCR allowed for repeated performances through video rentals that
otherwise would have been purchased, one witness testifying on behalf of
the creators of copyrighted works stated that his group was not inter-
ested in stopping or limiting video rental, but in receiving reasonable
compensation for the use of their works.' 2 7 In avoiding the issue of un-
authorized reproduction, the record rental legislation also failed to ad-
dress the question of how or whether copyright owners should be
compensated for the widespread home reproduction of their works.
The Copyright Office foresaw the problems created by Congress'
dodging of the home recording issue. In urging that Congress act rather
than wait for the Supreme Court's Sony decision, the Copyright Office
stated that there would be difficulty in drafting an appropriate decree,
making it impossible to bind all parties concerned if the Supreme Court
affirmed the Ninth Circuit decision.' 28 On the other hand, if the Ninth
Circuit decision were reversed, the issue would remain whether Congress
should modify that decision by imposing a levy system as proposed in
Senate Bill 31.129 The Court's ultimate reversal did leave open the ques-
tion of whether a royalty or some type of compensation system should be
audio taping." Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine, supra note 96, at 313-14 (Statement of David
Lange, Professor of Law, Duke University).
There are a number of instances in the First Sale hearings where taping, not rental, was identi-
fied as the true problem:
I still feel that ... a case has not been made that [rental itself] is a serious problem. I
am open to considering the copying as being a serious problem. But it seems to me that
that may best be addressed, if it's deemed advisable to address it, through some kind of
initial charge on the sale of blank tapes and/or equipment. I just find it hard to differenti-
ate between the rental of a tuxedo, if you will, . . . and the rental of a tape. The only
difference I can see is that one can be easily copied where the others cannot. If some kind
of satisfactory thing could be fashioned on the copying, it doesn't seem to me that the
rental is, in itself, a problem that ought to be attracked [sic].
Id. at 155 (Comment of Subcomm. Member Harold S. Sawyer).
"I'm not really sure that record rental is the problem. I think the problem is home taping." Id. at
165. (Comment of Chairman Kastenmeier).
"What we will have is two small outlets closed [if rental outlets are prohibited], but you still will
have massive home taping .... will you not? And home taping is apparently the root of the prob-
lem." Id. at 335 (Comment of Chairman Kastenmeier).
125. Id. at 686.
126. Id.
127. Id. (Testimony of Jack Golodner, Director, Department for Professional Employees, AFL-
CIO).
128. Video & Audio Home Taping, supra note 113, at 51 (Statement of David Ladd, Register of
Copyrights, Library of Congress).
129. Id.
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imposed, but Congress never answered that question in the record rental
legislation.
The Record Rental Amendment has been heralded as an example of
Congress' ability to act swiftly in protecting intellectual property from
the threat of new technological advances. ' 30 If the existing copyright law
did not adequately protect the rights of copyright owners, then the
amendment is indeed laudable. However, Congress evaded the problem
of unauthorized reproduction and thereby undermined the validity of the
amendment. In not confronting the real issue, the Record Rental
Amendment gives rise to a strained interpretation of copyright law. It is
an example of the judiciary's and legislature's inability to resolve the con-
flict between owners and users when a new technology upsets the balance
between their competing interests.
2. The Digital Audio Recorder Act
The inadequacy of addressing the home recording problem with a
narrowly drafted revision of the copyright law became apparent when
the need for legislation which did address the issue arose as soon as a new
technology appeared. This new technology, the digital audio tape
machine (DAT), makes recordings that are far superior in quality to con-
ventional analog tape recordings.' 3' As the availability of DAT
threatened a new means of copyright infringement, Congress responded
to copyright owners' call for relief with the proposed Digital Audio Re-
corder Act of 1987 (DARA). 32 DARA did not go further than the
hearing stage, but it is important because it reflects the need for copy-
right provisions that address new technologies. DARA was a trade re-
lated bill rather than a proposed copyright amendment, but it still would
130. Horowitz, supra note 96. The Record Rental Amendment was enacted less than two years
after it was proposed. This was remarkably swift considering that it took more than twenty years for
Congress to agree on the revised 1976 Copyright Act, and that proposed copyright bills often get lost
in the battle between competing interest groups. See, e.g., id. at 68; infra note 140 and accompany-
ing text.
131. See, e.g., Stevie Wonder Opposes S. 506 and H.R. 1384, the Digital Audio Recorder Act of
1987, 133 CONG. REC. 2429 (daily ed., June 16, 1987) (statement of Stevland Morris (Steve Won-
der)).
Analog recordings require a range of frequencies that can be distorted, while digital record-
ings-whether sound, text, or image-require a series of on-off computer pulses that create a signal
which is so close to that of the original work that the quality is near that of the original. See.
Comment, Disc, DATand Fair Use: Time to Reconsider?, 25 CAL. W.L. REV. 97 n. 2 (1988); THE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REVOLuTION, supra note 6.
132. Digital Audio Recorder Act of 1987, S. 506 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) and H.R. 1384.
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See also, H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) and S. 539, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (like the proposed Digital Audio Recording Act, these bills also dealt with
potential copyright infringement by prohibiting digital audio recorders lacking copy-code scanners).
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have had a great impact on copyright protection.133 The act proposed a
technical solution to protect intellectual property: it banned the manu-
facture or importation of any digital audio recording device that did not
have a copy-code scanner. 34 The scanner would disable the recording
function of a digital audio recorder after being triggered by a signal en-
coded in a digital audio tape recording, thereby preventing illegal copy-
ing. Once again, the issue of home copying resurfaced-and it was, not
surprisingly, outside the realm of the recently enacted record rental
legislation.
While DARA confronted the problem more directly than the Rec-
ord Rental Amendment, it still suffered from a narrow scope because it
addressed only copying by a digital audio recorder. With the advent of
new technologies with similar copying abilities, 135 the Act raised con-
cerns that, like the record rental legislation, its narrow scope would leave
other works unprotected. Furthermore, the copy-code scanner required
by DARA would stop all copying, denying access to those who had a
legitimate reason to copy. The result would have been an imbalance on
the side of copyright protection. In addition, as noted above, technical
solutions are not usually favored because they often fail or are soon over-
come by another technology. 136 Legislation like the Record Rental
133. See, Copyright Issues Presented by Digital Audio Tape, Hearings on S. 506 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary. 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1987).
134. 1987-88 Legislative Review and Outlook, 35 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
285 (Feb. 11, 1988). A "copy-code scanner chip"--to be built into audio recorders, would disable
the record function of the machine when it receives an encoded signal on the recording.
Even though DARA did not go beyond the hearings stage, the copyright issues presented by
DAT remained unresolved. Recently, the record industry and the manufacturers and distributors of
DAT machines reached an agreement to allow the sale of the recorders in the United States. The
agreement was viewed as a defeat for the record industry because there was no provision for a
royalty scheme or any other arrangement to compensate or protect the copyright owners. The only
concession granted by the manufacturers was a recommendation to Congress that legislation similar
to DARA be enacted that required technical limitations on the machines. One explanation for the
record industry's acquiescence in the battle over DAT was the fact that Sony, who developed the
DAT technology, acquired CBS Records, one of the major opponents of DAT. Goldberg, Labels
Back Down on DAT, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 21, 1989, at 26.
135. See, e.g., Sherrod, Pirating Issue in Fast-forward, Chicago Tribune, June 6, 1989, § 3, at 2,
col. 2 (agreement between copyright owners, Motion Pictures Association of America, and produ-
cers of dual-deck VCR to manufacture the VCR with anti-copying device similar to copy-code scan-
ner proposed in DARA).
136. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The results of a study on the use of copy-code
scanners in digital audio recorders suggested that it was not likely to be a successful means of protec-
tion. Copyrights, DAT, 35 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 351 (March 3, 1988). The
National Bureau of Standards (NBS) concluded:
[T]hat the encoding system which the recording industry wants installed on digital audio
tapes (DAT) machines only prevents copying half the time, affects the quality of encoded
recordings, and could be easily bypassed.
On March 1st, NBS released the results of its study on DAT machines which was
requested by both House and Senate committees in response to pending legislation ....
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Amendment and the Digital Audio Recorder Act is too narrow when
one considers that disc technology has made available products which
contain video, audio, and textual information. 137 The problem of unau-
thorized home copying will continue to resurface because it has never
adequately been resolved nor specifically addressed.
IV. LEGISLATIVELY IMPOSED COMPULSORY LICENSING VS. A
MARKET SOLUTION
The failure of the Digital Audio Recorder Act, along with the nar-
rowly drafted Record Rental Amendment, illustrates the difficulty in
drafting legislation that both protects the copyright owner and provides
access to intellectual property in the face of new technological innova-
tions. Given the inability of the courts and Congress to provide adequate
solutions, is the state of technology such that the conflict between copy-
right owners and users is becoming irreconcilable?
A. Compulsory Licensing and Market Solutions
In an insightful lecture delivered over a decade ago, Barbara Ringer,
then Register of Copyrights, 138 discussed compulsory licensing as a pos-
sible solution when technology advances to the level where it becomes
impossible to balance owners' and users' rights. 139 The steps Ringer out-
lined in her lecture on the process of adapting copyright law to new tech-
nology seemed to be a script for the legislation that emerged at the end of
the home recording controversy:
The copy-prevention system does not achieve its stated purpose, according to John Lyons
of the NBS National Engineering Laboratory. The problems with the system, he added,
probably cannot be ironed out.
Id. For a more detailed critique of the digital audio legislation, see Comment, supra note 131.
137. General Electric currently produces a video display technology called Digital Video Inter-
active (DVI) which mixes text and motion pictures on compact disks. DVI promises to out-perform
the existing Compact Disk-Interactive technology. See Intel Buys DVI Video Technology from GE,
INFO. INDUSTRY BULL., 1, 7, vol. 4, no. 40. (Oct. 20, 1988).
One recent innovation makes these technologies portable, increasing the accessibility and use of
works. A Revolutionary Way to View Your Data: The Private Eye, LASERDISK PROFESSIONAL, Sept.
1988, at 12. "Private Eye is a breakthrough in display technology. It is a miniaturized display that
is only I" high by 1.2" deep by 3.2" wide. When you hold it up to your eye and look into it, what
you see appears to be a full-size monitor about two feet from your eyes .... It lets you provide full-
screen capabilities in a very portable package." Id. It would also have a certain amount of RAM to
store downloaded material and will eventually work with a portable CD player very much like a
Walkman. Id. at 13-14.
See also supra notes 5-7 (discussion of possibility of not only storing, but transmitting digital
sound, text, and images).
138. Barbara Ringer was the United States Register of Copyrights in 1976.
139. Ringer, Copyright in the 1980s, 23 BuLL.. COPYRIGHT SoC'y 299 (1976).
Compulsory licenses provide for the right to use a copyrighted work if certain procedures are
followed and a statutorily defined fee is paid. D. JOHNSTON, COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK 115 (1978).
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- First you have a copyright law that was written at a particular point
in the development of communications technology, and without much
foresight.
- Then you have technological developments, which create whole new
areas for the creation and use of copyrighted works.
- Business investments are made and industries begin to develop.
- The law is ambiguous in allocating rights and liabilities, so no one
pays royalties.
- A point is reached where the courts simply stop expanding the copy-
right law and say that only Congress can solve the problem by
legislation.
- You go to Congress, but you find that you have hundreds of special
interest groups lobbying for or against the expansion of rights, and the
legislative task is horrendous. 140
The Sony conflict, which arose years later, followed these steps exactly:
1) the development of the VCR allowed for the creation and use of copy-
righted works on video; 2) large investments were made in the develop-
ment of the VCR and video rental industries, and they quickly grew; 3)
because the technology was available and works could be easily copied,
and the law was ambiguous as to whether they could be copied or not,
VCR owners reproduced copyrighted works without compensating the
owners; 4) the courts' response to the owner/user conflict was to defer to
Congress; 5) Congress was barraged with a number of groups lobbying
for both users' and owners' rights, which perhaps explains the limited
nature of the legislation it finally enacted.
Ringer concluded her outline with a discussion of compulsory li-
censing as a solution in cases where conflicts over equally legitimate in-
terests are apparently incapable of resolution. 141 Compulsory licensing
systems require payment for use of a work based on a fee fixed by some
agency. The Copyright Act provides for governmentally imposed licens-
ing schemes. The Copyright Office, in conjunction with the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, 42 administers the establishment and distribution of
royalties under statutorily imposed compulsory licensing schemes for
cable transmissions, the manufacture and distribution of phonorecords,
and the performance of nondramatic musical works on jukeboxes.
14 3
For example, cable television system owners obtain compulsory licenses
by paying part of their gross receipts to the Copyright Register, where-
upon the monies are deposited in a general account. The Copyright Roy-
140. Ringer, supra note 139, at 306.
141. Id. at 139-40.
142. 17 U.S.C. § 801 (1982). The Copyright Royalty Tribunal was established under the Copy-
right Act of 1976. Id.
143. See 17 U.S.C. §§ I ll(d), 115, 116(b) (1982) (compulsory licensing provisions for cable
transmissions, non-dramatic musical works, and jukeboxes).
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alty Tribunal then distributes the royalties to copyright owners who file
claims with the Tribunal. 144
Noting that compulsory licensing schemes seem to be fair to each
side (the owner is compensated and the user has free access to the work),
Ringer stated that compulsory licensing may be the only solution when
new technology makes exclusive rights under copyright law impossi-
ble. 1 45 Other commentators have also noted that licensing systems will
become necessary as problems of enforcement are exacerbated by devel-
oping technologies.146 For example, compulsory licensing has been sug-
gested as a solution to the problem of home audio taping. Elaborating on
language in the Ninth Circuit Sony opinion, 4 7 Nimmer advocated the
use of a royalty system as a judicial remedy in cases of infringing home
copying of audio works. 148 He envisioned plaintiff copyright owners li-
censing defendant manufacturers of audio recording equipment to con-
tinue production of the infringing equipment in exchange for a
percentage of the manufacturers' sales. 149 Nimmer also considered the
likelihood that manufacturers would shift the cost of the royalty to the
consumer, justifying this action: "because the consumer is the primary
infringer, there is no reason why he should not ultimately pay for the
privilege of recording copyrighted works."' 15 0
A licensing scheme seems to be an attractive solution to the home
recording conflict. Under such a scheme, home recording would be tol-
erated and at the same time owners would receive some compensation
where they otherwise would receive none. In recalling the irreconcilable
differences over which owners and users fought for years in the Sony
litigation and in the legislature, a licensing scheme appears to strike a
workable balance. As discussed earlier,' 5 ' Senator Mathias proposed a
compulsory licensing solution in the context of the Sony conflict, but that
144. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
145. Ringer, supra note 139, at 306-7.
146. Braunstein, Fischer, Ordover, & Baumol, Economics of Property Rights as Applied to Coin-
puter Software and Databases, in TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT 245 (Bush and Dreyfuss eds. 1979)
[hereinafter Braunstein].
147. See Sony, 659 F.2d at 976. (In fact, the language to which Nimmer refers, in which the
Ninth Circuit suggests awarding continuing payment of royalties rather than grant injunction, is the
court's citing of Nimmer himself.)
148. Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording. Dispelling the Betamnax Myth, 68
VA. L. REV. 1505, 1530 (1982).
A recent comment proposed a licensing scheme as a solution to the home audio copying prob-
lem as exacerbated by the availability of digital audio tape. Comment, supra note 131.
149. Nimmer, supra note 148, at 1533.
150. Id. at 1531.
151. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
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proposal was left behind as lobbyists pursued the rental legislation.15 2
Like Ringer, Mathias concluded that a compulsory licensing scheme
seemed to be the most equitable solution where new technology makes it
difficult to balance owners' and users' rights. 53 His proposal would have
created a legislatively imposed licensing scheme that would direct the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal to set fees based on the sale of recording
devices and recording media such as blank tapes. 154 Individuals would
be able to copy television programs without worrying about copyright
liability, and copyright owners would be compensated. 55 Manufacturers
and importers of recording equipment and media would pay the royalty,
thereby avoiding the problem of collecting compensation from individu-
als. 156 While the manufacturers would likely pass along to consumers
the cost of the royalty, those individuals who purchased a number of
tapes to build libraries of recorded programs would absorb more of the
cost than those who purchased one tape and used it repeatedly for non-
infringing purposes. 57 Given the rapid changes in technology and the
difficulties that have continued to resurface since Sony, perhaps a licens-
ing scheme should be considered once again.
Compulsory licensing systems have their own set of problems, of
course. In allowing a centralized external agency to set fees and deter-
mine royalties, the copyright owner loses much control of her work. 5 8
This loss of control is not as unattractive under a private licensing ar-
rangement where the owner maintains some control, but is unacceptable
where the government becomes heavily involved. Ringer, for example,
worried about the prospect of the Copyright Office taking on too much of
a regulatory role if it became involved in a licensing scheme. She ex-
pressed concern about "government control over the conditions of au-
thorship,"' 59 because it invited intrusive state oversight of creative
endeavors and threatened the loss of individuality of authors and
works.' 60 For this reason, and because such regulation tends to sweep
too broadly, governmentally imposed compulsory licensing seems to be
152. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 104, at 32207. "The very ingenuity of our age that has produced these
remarkable technologies should be able to devise the laws to accommodate them."
154. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
155. Amend. No. 1242, supra note 104, at 32206.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Braunstein, supra note 146, at 243 (noting net loss to copyright holder).
159. Ringer, supra note 139, at 310.
160. Id. at 303, 309.
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an appropriate solution only in extreme instances.'61 While the wide-
spread availability of home recording devices may constitute such an ex-
treme instance, a solution that invites centralized governmental control
over intellectual property may be going too far. In fact, compulsory li-
censing has been criticized for opening the door to governmental intru-
sion where the marketplace has been successful in working out its own
problems. 1
6 2
A market solution-wherein private entrepreneurs rather than gov-
ernment employees address problems of copyright infringement'
63 -
avoids the possibility of governmental intrusion and has enough merit to
warrant consideration. For example, a marketplace option can accom-
modate technological change with no government intervention. Another
advantage of a market solution is the greater capacity of the marketplace
to keep pace with rapid technological change, a major downfall of copy-
right law. Also the needs of both owners and users are better met, as in
the case of privately negotiated contracts. 1
64
While a thorough study of the market of intellectual goods is be-
yond the scope of this Note,165 a look at one of the latest advancements
in video and audio technology suggests that a market solution is possible.
Until very recently, one of the most pressing issues left unresolved after
Sony was how to cope with the new compact disc and digital technolo-
gies, which facilitate the unauthorized reproduction of master-like cop-
ies.' 66 While this issue still poses problems for copyright owners, a
recently developed technique for encoding motion pictures on compact
disc may soon provide a market solution that dispels fears of copyright
161. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure. A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613 (1982).
"In extreme instances, Congress may correct for market distortions by imposing a regulatory
solution such as a compulsory licensing scheme .... But the broad brush of this regulatory solution
is too sweeping for most cases." Id. The example Gordon used to illustrate such an extreme in-
volved the threat of monopolistic control over the manufacture of mechatical recordings such as
piano rolls. Congress dealt with the problem by providing that anyone could make or sell recordings
of copyrighted works as long as he paid the copyright owner a statutorily determined fee. Id. (citing
Studies prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., The Compulsory License Provisions of the U.S. Copyright Law
(Study No. 5) 11 (Comm. Print 1960) (H. Henn)).
162. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works. supra note 94, at 285 (Statement of George Atkin-
son, President, The Video Station, Inc.).
163. OTA Report, supra note 8. at 89.
164. Id.
165. For an overview of economic theory as applied to intellectual property law, see McCain.
InJbrnation as Property and as a Public Good. Perspectives from the Economic Theory of Property
Rights, 1988 LIBR. Q. 265.
166. See, cg.. Fleischmann. Impact of Digital Technology on Copyright Law. J. PAT. O1T. SOC'Y.
5 (1988).
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infringement.' 67 The technique will make these "paperback movies,"
like paperback books, so inexpensive to produce and distribute that there
would be no economic advantage to making illegal copies of them.
68
That this product has been developed without any compulsory licensing
or additional copyright protection supports the idea that tolerance of
some infringing free-riders may be a cost of doing business for copyright
owners who wish to tap new technological media. 169 In the case of the
"paperback movie" product, the technology and market changed so rap-
idly that it apparently provided its own solution to the problem of
infringement.
On the other hand, the adequacy of the marketplace to work out
these problems has been questioned.' 70 Clearly, if the marketplace alone
provided an adequate solution there would never have been a need for
any statutory protection such as the copyright law.' 7 ' But as one writer
describes it, there is a market in copyrighted goods: copyright law allows
a consensual market to function by creating property rights, lowering
transaction costs, and providing valuable information and mechanisms
for enforcement.17 2 However, copyright markets do not always perform
adequately. 7 3  While copyright law allows for consensual transfers,
when the bargaining becomes prohibitive or enforcement against free-
riders becomes impractical, or when other market flaws arise, desirable
consensual exchanges may be unattainable: in those cases, the market
cannot be relied on to balance owners' and users' interests.' 74 The avail-
ability of a new technology can be a source of market flaws. The market
poses a greater risk to intellectual property owners when a new technol-
ogy is involved because often the transaction costs are high and, espe-
cially where the product is accessible by individual home users, the
expected profits are low. '
5
Given the lack of certainty and potential pitfalls in the marketplace,
167. Karraker, Media Lab Puts Movies on CDs, VIDEO COMPUTING, Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 6. The
product was developed by MIT's Media Lab. While still in its early stages. "[t]he project may
someday lead to the transmission of encoded video directly to homes in a matter of minutes over
standard telephone wires.- Id.
168. Id.
169. The conflict over reproduction of copyrighted works is paralleled in the area of photocopy-
ing. "A certain minimum level of 'background noise' in the form of small-scale infringements (per-
haps quite numerous) may have to be tolerated as a cost of doing business." Gleason. Publishers'
and Librarians' Views on Copyright and Photocopying, 20 SCHOLARt.Y PUB. 13, 21 (1988).
170. For a thorough critique of marketplace solutions, see Gordon, supra note 161.
171. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
172. Gordon, supra note 161, at 1612-13.
173. Id. at 1613.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1628.
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a legislatively imposed compulsory licensing scheme begins to look at-
tractive once again. But in weighing the two evils, an omnipresent gov-
ernment or an unpredictable market, relying on a market solution seems
far preferable-especially where the legislature is unable to provide an
adequate solution.
B. A Compromise. the Use of Private Agencies to Administer
Compensation Schemes for Copyrighted Works
When technological development reaches a level where there seems
to be no adequate response other than a legislatively imposed compulsory
licensing system on the one extreme or a market solution on the other,
perhaps a compromise between the two extremes is most appropriate.
76
Rather than a congressionally imposed compulsory licensing system, vol-
untary licensing should be encouraged. Under a voluntary system, copy-
right owners could negotiate their own royalty scheme. Where the
license was arranged between private parties, copyright owners would
maintain control over their property and receive the desired compensa-
tion. Users would benefit by gaining access to the works without having
to wonder whether they were infringing on the copyright because the
owner would have consented to their use. The only external involvement
would be that of the courts to enforce the contract between the owner
and the manufacturer or'distributer.
177
One criticism of voluntary licensing schemes is that negotiating roy-
alty arrangements with every user, distributor or owner of a copyrighted
work (or with manufacturers of recording equipment) would be overly
burdensome for all parties to the contract.1 78 An alternative would be
the use of a private agency, such as the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) or Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI),1 79 to
176. A voluntary licensing solution is far from novel, particularly where a new technology
threatens the balance of copyright law. See Nimmer, supra note 148, at 1534. Nimmer discusses the
use of a voluntary licensing approach as a judicial remedy in conflicts between plaintiff copyright
owners and defendant infringers whereby the two parties would negotiate a royalty which the court
would then enforce. Id. at 1533. This Note suggests that voluntary licensing arrangements should be
encouraged between owners of copyrighted works and distributors or users before infringement oc-
curs.
A recent comment on the digital audio recorder legislation proposed a similar solution. Com-
ment, supra note 131.
177. Nimmer, supra note 148.
178. See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 1, at 528-29 (hypothesizing about the dilemma of a hotel which
tries to arrange licenses for each recorded work it rebroadcasts: "Besides getting an ASCAP license.
must the hotel bargain separately with every independent composer on the chance that his music
may come through to the hotel patrons?").
179. For a history of ASCAP and BMI, see Note, CBS v. ASCAP." Blanket Licensing anld the
Unresolved Conflict beiween Copyright and Antitrust Law, 13 CONN. L. RFrv. 465. 470-76 (1981).
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administer licensing of works and distribution of royalties. 80 ASCAP
and BMI are private performing rights societies which sell blanket
licenses for the use of copyrighted works, remitting a portion of the li-
censing fees to the copyright owners."8  In exchange for the administra-
tive services of the agency, the owner gives up some control over her
work, but still maintains at least a say in the use of the work. Here, the
owner chooses to contract with the private organization, as opposed to
having royalties and terms of protection set by the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal or some other government agency. Placing the administration
of licensing fees in the hands of a private organization would eliminate
the regulatory role of the government, thereby reducing the risk of exten-
sive state control of intellectual property. 8 2 The existence of such pri-
vate organizations may not stop unauthorized copying by individuals
but, in providing a systematic and centralized means of disseminating
copyrighted works, they do provide a natural "bottleneck" where copy-
right owners can collect compensation. 83 Also, if a copyright owner
chose not to register with a private agency, other market alternatives,
such as private contracts and technical solutions, would still be viable
options for protection.
84
Voluntary licensing can be considered a "compromise" between
180. Nimmer advocated a blanket licensing approach and the use of a private organization,
Nimmer, supra note 148, at 1532.
181. One of the most obvious difficulties posed by a licensing scheme is establishing a means of
calculating and dispersing fees to copyright owners. Nimmer noted this complication in his proposal
of a licensing scheme for sound recording devices, but also stated that such problems are "by no
means insuperable." Id. at 1532.
If technology makes possible Kaplan's vision "linked systems" of all past and future copy-
righted works, perhaps even licensing schemes will become impractical. Kaplan, supra note 7. For
example, in the case of a single product that makes available digitized text, sound and images-each
representing different copyrighted works-a licensing scheme could be difficult to administer. In
considering the impact of digital technology on copyright protection, some writers have suggested
alternatives to licensing schemes. For example, information could be priced as a raw commodity or
publishers could charge for the organization or arrangement, modification and update of their works
instead of charging by the copy. Miller, Digital Revolution, Wall St. J., supra note 7, at A4. A
private agency such as ASCAP could facilitate this type of arrangement administratively by serving
as a "broker" or clearinghouse of copyrighted works.
182. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
183. 1. DiE SOt A Pooi., TLCHNOIOGIES O1 FREEDIoM 216 (1983). De Sola Pool discussed this
"bottleneck" effect in reference to a case where the defendant, the Board of Cooperative Educational
Services (BOCES) of Erie County, New York. was videotaping programs off the air for use in
schools without the copyright owner's permission. Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks.
558 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). While BOCES could be stopped, nothing could prevent indi-
vidual teachers and students from copying the programs-as they would be more likely to do with-
out access to the works through BOCES. Closing down BOCES resulted in the destruction of an
organization from which the copyright owners could collect compensation for use of their works.
184. For example, the development of a dual-deck VCR raised great concerns about copyright
protection because of its capacity for duplicating copyrighted works not only off the air but from
rented videotapes. The manufacturers won the blessings of copyright owners (the Motion Pictures
Association of America) to produce and market the VCR when they signed an agreement requiring
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governmentally administered compulsory licensing and a pure market
approach, but it clearly represents a market solution that involves a
quasi-legislative entity. Voluntary licensing involves no modification of
or amendment to the Copyright Act. Although the courts and lobbyists
for both copyright owners and users have strenuously lobbied Congress
to adapt the copyright law to changing technology, perhaps no legislative
action is the best solution where the conflicting interests are so great that
Congress seems unable to solve the problem.
The Copyright Act creates a delicate balance' 8 5 between the inter-
ests of copyright owners and users. A shift in this balance, prompted by
legislative action, may pose a greater threat to the interests of both own-
ers and users than the problem purportedly being resolved. This theory
applies not only to additional legislation that would govern new technol-
ogies, but also to the repeal of existing sections of the Copyright Act.
Abolishing the fair use doctrinel1 6 (which has been recommended by at
least two commentators) 187 as a solution for dealing with copyright in-
fringements made possible by new technologies would be premature.
The fair use doctrine contributes to the balance in copyright law and
should not be discarded. 18 8 Denying fair use rights would shift the bal-
ance of copyright law in favor of copyright owners. Again, legislative
action would threaten the balance of rights in copyright law rather than
enhance it.
V. CONCLUSION
As technology develops more rapidly than ever, copyright owners
and users will continue to press for revisions of the Copyright Act. The
Record Rental Amendment is an example of a legislative response to the
battle between copyright owners and users that resulted from the availa-
bility of a new recording technology. The Amendment also illustrates,
along with the court cases that led up to its enactment, the difficulty of
resolving such conflicts. Instead of narrowly drafted, piecemeal legisla-
tion like the Record Rental Amendment or the Digital Audio Recorder
the inclusion of a device which picks up a signal to prevent movies from being copied. Sherrod,
supra note 135.
This anti-copying device is similar to the copy-code scanner proposed for digital audio record-
ers. See supra note 136. However, in this case the device would be included under a private agree-
ment rather than by government decree.
185. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussion of balance in copyright law).
186. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
187. See Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 15: Fleischmann, supra note 166, at 25.
188. For example, the motion pictures encoded on compact disc that will be so inexpensive to
produce could be used for educational or scholarly purposes that would cause no economic harm to
the copyright holder. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
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Act, a market solution such as voluntary licensing is the best answer.
Otherwise copyright law will become saddled with provisions that will
not only become obsolete but will ultimately upset the balance between
the rights of owners and users.

